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ED GODFREY: THE JUSTICE, THE
PERSON, AND SOME CASES ON
PROPERTY
Merle W. Loper*
I recently heard Ed Godfrey discuss the difficulties of writing for
publication. One of those difficulties, he said, was the courage it
took-accepting for oneself the presumption (or was it presump-
tuousness?) that you had something worth adding. The task is espe-
cially daunting when it involves a public assessment of Justice
Godfrey's judicial performance in the very area that has comprised
his primary teaching subject over the years, the law of property.
Nor is the difficulty lessened when part of the task is to relate those
judicial contributions more broadly, yet meaningfully, to the person
Ed Godfrey is.
One of my earlier memories of Ed Godfrey comes from a faculty
meeting in the early 1970s. In the midst of one of those always in-
sightful faculty discussions of curriculum, Ed gruffly wondered
whether anyone was still teaching students how to "parse a case" in
the good old-fashioned way, earning your legal knowledge by mas-
tery of the relevant details.
While his emphasis on the "parsing of cases," the mastering of
detail, is to me a fundamental characteristic of Ed Godfrey, it is in-
herently connected to a broader vision. More recently we had a
conversation in which he described to me a book he was reading
about the role of chaotic behavior in the operation of systems,1 and,
with some wonderment, the argument therein that a bird's moving
wing on Pluto necessarily affects the rest of the universe. Details are
important because they are essential to understanding the whole;
they are, indeed, themselves a part of the whole.
Ed Godfrey's breadth of interests and vision encompasses far
more, though, than simply an enlarged view of the scope of legal
issues and the ordinary mechanics of the law. It includes history,
philosophy, science, art, music, literature, and bridge-the pano-
rama of human experience. His reading of Chaos is itself but one
example. Indeed, shortly after the same faculty meeting in which he
spoke of "parsing the cases," he sat listening to his beloved Schwarz-
kopf singing Wagner. His 1993 Annual Alumni Dinner address,
* Professor, University of Maine School of Law, B.A., Northwestern University,
J.D., University of Chicago.
1. JAMES GLnIcKc, CRAos: MANruo A Naw Scwi cn (1987).
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"Getting Along with Nietzsche," 2 surveyed the past 80-150 years of
music, art, philosophy, politics, law, and social change and related it
all to the ethics of padding one's billable hours.
But one of the most notable characteristics of Ed Godfrey, and
made all the more remarkable by those others, is that he is just so
naturally himself, real and without pretension. What he seeks to do
are simply the tasks before him. What he seeks to understand, in
the details and in broad vision, is that which is relevant. And the
purpose is to do things the way they should be done and to make
them meaningful in the most concrete and straightforward way.
What else should a person do, you might expect to hear him wonder,
and why pay tribute to someone for doing what he should do
anyway?
What Archibald MacLeish once said of Felix Frankfurter applies
as well to Ed Godfrey: despite his enormous public and personal
accomplishments, his greatest achievement is the person he is for
those who know him.3 That naturalness of "who he is" has consist-
ently manifested itself through his time as Dean of the Law School,
in his life as a teacher, and in his relationships with colleagues and
friends. His unheralded but strategic assistance over the years has
aided, no doubt, far more students than we can guess. Nearly
twenty years ago he delivered to the Maine Law School graduates of
1976 the most appropriate commencement address I have ever
heard. After modestly expressing his genuine appreciation for their
"invitation to say goodbye," he proceeded to compress into three
double-spaced pages a remarkable compendium of sage, if wry,
comment and advice, closing unabashedly with a love sonnet invok-
ing the irrevocability of having been loved-presumably by the
graduates, their predecessors, and all of us.
All of these characteristics-the attention to detail, the breadth of
vision, the naturalness of his concern for those with whom his life
and responsibilities intersect-are reflected as well in the decisions
and in the content and the style of the opinions he wrote for the
court.
I. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING A JUDGE SHOULD Do
This section could as well be called "Reading Deeds and Walking
the Line." Over a quarter of the Godfrey "property case" opinions
(more than any other single category in this area) deal with deed
descriptions: finding the boundaries described, or supposedly de-
scribed, therein. What more appropriately rigorous exercise for a
2. Edward S. Godfrey, Getting Along with Nietzsche, Address Before the Uni-
versity of Maine School of Law Alumni Annual Dinner (Nov. 6, 1993), in U. ME.
LAW ScH. ALUMNI QUARTERLY, No. 50, Winter 1993.
3. Archibald MacLeish, Felix Frankfurter: A Lesson of Faith, 1966 Sup. Cr. Ruv.
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parser of words and cases than figuring out a deed's legal descrip-
tion and laying it out on the face of the earth? Such cases ordinarily
give little opportunity for great contributions to the development of
law.' (Indeed, it can be a significant achievement just to get through
some of them.)
The contribution that Ed Godfrey's opinions do reveal in these
cases, however, is probably the most important kind of contribution
that a judge can make: a careful, intelligent, and sensitive consider-
ation of the respective, individual disputes of the parties. What can
be learned from them is that which can be learned from examples of
the highest standards of analysis, from examples of a judge fulfilling
his responsibilities both to the parties and the law, whatever confus-
ing complexities the cases may present. Such a contribution, con-
sistently performed over the years, should not be underestimated; it
is what every party has a right to, what honest litigants want, and
what the legal system fundamentally assumes.
The last of these deed cases, Proctor v. Hinkley,' decided a few
months before Ed Godfrey left the bench, stands as a culmination of
the model. The parties were abutting owners who derived their re-
spective titles from a common grantor. The Hinckleys owned their
lot through a 1942 deed to a described portion of the grantor's land.
Proctor had his by a subsequent conveyance of the remaining por-
tion, expressly excepting the previously conveyed Hinkley lot. The
crucial issue was the description and location of the Hinkley lot, a
relatively small parcel on the westerly shore of Sheepscot Lake.
The disagreement was over the location of the western and south-
ern boundaries. Both the northwest and southwest corners were de-
scribed by specific monuments, namely "to a stake and a stone," as
well as by specific distance calls. The southern line ran "east" to the
high water mark and then to the low water mark of the lake shore.
When the parties' surveyors attempted to lay the deed description
onto the unshaven and wrinkled face of the earth, however, the situ-
ation became, quite frankly, impossible. There was an apparent in-
consistency between the distance call and a questionably identifiable
monument at the northwest corner, another distance inconsistency
between that corner and the missing southwest monument, an ap-
parent absurdity in applying the compass direction going east on the
4. Any area, of course, will eventually present questions affecting the direction of
legal development. One of the deed description cases did present a new question as
to the use of referees to resolve cases on summary judgment motions, where there
can be no question of any material factual dispute. Hedberg v. Wallingford, 379
A.2d 126 (Me. 1977). Recognizing that the primary purpose of such referrals is to
deal with complex factual inquiries, and finding that the referee in that case had
acted within the scope of the reference order and had not based his report on the
resolution of any disputed factual issues, the court approved the limited use of refer-
ees where special expertise would be appropriate and helpful. Id. at 127-28.
5. 462 A.2d 465 (Me. 1983).
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southern line, and the inherent difficulty of determining at the time
of the parties' 1977 surveys what the original high and low water
marks were in 1942. Both surveyors had struggled with the difficul-
ties. The evidence had been extensive and conflicting, as one might
expect in light of the wages of time on human memory and the influ-
ence of self-interest on the recollections of disputing parties.
But Ed Godfrey (with the court and, no doubt, his law clerk) went
out (figuratively, of course) and "walked the line" to assure that
even an impossible situation would ultimately be decided, to the ex-
tent possible, by a careful, sensitive and proper application of the
law. Boundaries are, after all, important to those who claim them,
despite so many well documented failures to properly delineate
them.
Starting with the first deed call at the low water mark on the east
end of the northern line, he went westerly and found that the refe-
ree's location of the disputed "stake and stone" monument in favor
of the Hinkleys was based on sufficient evidence to establish the
northwest corner (prevailing, of course, over the inconsistent dis-
tance call). A stake at the southwest corner, even though not the
original monument, was also sufficient to serve as the missing one,
but only because the referee had found there was a previous agree-
ment by the parties, which was supported by competent evidence,
although disputed by Proctor.
On the other hand, the "nail" fixed by the Hinkley's surveyor as a
"monument" to set the low water mark and thereby, somehow, the
southeast corner could not legally serve as a monument, any more
than the same surveyor's (ultimately irrelevant) "pin near the hem-
lock tree" could serve to locate the northern high water mark: to
serve as a monument the marker must be mentioned as such in the
deed. And no one had presented any competent evidence to show
where the low water mark was, a finding that was crucial to estab-
lishing the southern boundary (as well as the eastern boundary that
ran along the low water contour of the lake).
The court thus upheld the referee's establishment of the western
line but had to send the case back to determine the southern bound-
ary, which presumably could be done only after hearing further
evidence.
In the midst of the court's even-handed loyalty to the careful and
proper application of law even in such an impossible dispute, the
sense of angst is evident:
It is obvious that the referee, faced with a set of poorly drawn
conveyances, did his best to bring this litigation to a sensible
and fair conclusion. It is regrettable that his definition of the
parties' common boundaries must be partially undone because
of technical error when the only practical result is to leave un-
settled the ownership of a few square feet of terrain having
[Vol. 47:295
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little economic value. This court urges counsel for both par-
ties to try to persuade their clients to enter into some practical
but formal and recordable agreement locating the boundary
line in question.
6
The court-and especially the justice responsible for the opinion-
also had labored hard, with the best, though limited, tools available
to an appellate court, toward the goal of properly resolving this dis-
pute between the individual litigants.7
It is unnecessary to walk the line in the other deed description
cases in order to make the point. The pattern is consistent through-
out.8 Appropriate deference is accorded to the fact-finder, yet the
discussion demonstrates such a thorough examination and under-
standing as to belie any doubt that the court's scrivener understood
the record and cared deeply about the proper outcome. These opin-
ions reveal, as well, an intuitive perception fundamental to sound
legal analysis: relevant basic legal concepts are recognized and un-
derstood, laying clear the various parts of a picture that might other-
wise, and often would, be wrong or confused.9
6. 1& at 473.
7. Having come through even more evidentiary and analytical complications than
I have outlined in my simplified summary, the court, in a rather sardonic footnote,
wryly noted its gratitude that the lot's extension to the low water mark avoided yet
another issue: the need to "invoke the complicated rules" concerning the division
among coterminous owners between the high-water and low-water marks. -At least
that problem is not raised by the terms of this conveyance." Id. at 473 n.7. I.e.. the
problems already present were sufficient to the case.
8. See Rodrigue v. Morin, 377 A.2d 476 (Me. 1977); Hedberg v. Wallingford, 379
A.2d 126 (Me. 1977); Bailey v. Look, 432 A.2d 1271 (Me. 1981); Dumais v. Gagnon,
433 A.2d 730 (Me. 1981). See also McMullen v. Dowley, 418 A.2d 1147, 1149-51
(Me. 1980) (turning on issues of adverse possession, but illustrating the same careful
attention to the attempted parsing of the deeds).
9. A notable example is the unraveling and reweaving of the interrelated refor-
mation, restitution, breach of covenant, and estoppel by deed issues in Dumais v.
Gagnon, 433 A.2d 730 (Me. 1981). A mutual mistake had been made by describing
in the deed a parcel on the northwest end of highway frontage rather than on the
intended southeast end. Id. at 733-34. The grantee had entered onto the intended,
rather than the described parcel. Id. at 734. A subsequent deed conveyed the gran-
tor's remaining land to another grantee, specifically excepting the parcel previously
conveyed. When the mistake came to light, the two grantees engaged in an ex-
change of deeds to correct the record, for which the second grantee required and
was paid $1,500 by the prior grantee. Id at 735. The common grantor filed a suit for
reformation of the first deed. The first grantee sided with the grantor on reforma-
tion and sought restitution of the $1,500. The second grantee (who had notice, but
not actual knowledge of the mistake and who had suffered no harm in reliance on it)
counterclaimed for breach of the warranty covenants. Id. at 735-36, 738. The court
held that once reformation had been granted restitution followed, since the re-
formed deed itself was correct, making the exchange of "corrective" deeds irrelevant
and unnecessary. Id at 736-37. The reformed deed also vitiated any breach of war-
ranty in the second conveyance, since the deed, once reformed, kept the mistakenly
granted southeast parcel with the grantor and, through estoppel by deed, automati-
cally conveyed that ownership to the subsequent grantee. Id. at 737 n.l.
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II. THE REASONED MOVEMENT OF THE LAW
Ed Godfrey's own uniqueness precludes any characterization as
simply the product of a particular time. Yet he could not help but
be influenced by the traditional common law view of a judge's role
in a democratic system. As classically put by Justice Cardozo, the
role of a judge is to develop the law interstitially,1" moving it for-
ward to meet changing needs and perceptions, but within the dual
parameters of deciding individual cases, with their broader law-mak-
ing implications, while respecting the established precedents and the
expressed legislative will. This does, indeed, describe those Godfrey
opinions that deal with such opportunities for moving the law for-
ward in the property area. That task is, in fact, complementary to
the task of deciding cases through a thorough, intelligent, sensitive,
and craftsman-like approach.
Immediately before his appointment to the Court in 1976, Ed
Godfrey was serving as chief consultant to the Maine Probate Law
Revision Commission, which was then in the beginning stages of
thoroughly reexamining that entire area of Maine law. Its compre-
hensive package of substantive law reforms, modeled extensively on
the Uniform Probate Code, was enacted by the Legislature in 1979
but did not generally become effective until the beginning of 1981.11
Most of the Godfrey term thus occurred during the period of transi-
tion between the law-to-be-reformed and the effective date of the
eventual reformation.
One case that can serve as an example of the Godfrey approach,
Staples v. King,'2 involved an apparent attempt to defeat a surviving
spouse's elective share through inter vivos conveyances-a major
area of probate law reform that had not been clearly resolved in
Maine law. 3 Shortly before his death, the decedent set up several
revocable trusts in favor of a child and two grandchildren, retaining
substantial powers during his lifetime as trustee. After his death,
the surviving widow challenged the trusts as illusory and invalid as
testamentary will substitutes. The probate court had granted the
beneficiaries' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Old Maine case law expressly established that one could disinherit
one's spouse by depleting one's estate through inter vivos transfers
as long as it was done through complete gifts, 4 but not if it consti-
10. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
11. P.L. 1979, ch. 540, § 53 (effective January 1, 1981).
12. 433 A.2d 407 (Me. 1981).
13. MAINE PROBATE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE COMMIS.
SION'S STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING MAINE PROBATE LAW, 69
(1978); UNIF. PROBATE CODE, §§ 2-201 to 2-207 (1975) (the "augmented estate").
14. Lambert v. Lambert, 117 Me. 471, 104 A. 820 (1918).
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tuted a fraudulently illusory transaction."5 The latter protective
doctrine, however, never had been applied to revocable trusts,
which generally were held to be a valid means for transferring trust
property. The Maine statute protecting against spousal disinheri-
tance had replaced common law dower with the spouse's "rights of
descent" and by its terms applied only to property that was ovned
by the decedent at his death.'6 That statute had been replaced by
the Uniform Probate Code's "augmented estate" concept, which no
doubt would have equitably protected the surviving spouse in this
case. The new code, however, had not yet become effective at the
time of the transactions or the decedent's death.
Another problem lay in the nature of one of the challenges to the
transactions' validity: that they were "testamentary" in nature and
thus violated the formal execution requirements of the Statute of
Wills. Modem views generally favor upholding commonly used
"will substitutes" as simpler, more practical, and less expensive
means of transfer at death. The traditional doctrine of "testamen-
tary" transfers had been largely rejected on that basis by the provi-
sions of the new Probate Code.' 7
The Godfrey opinion's analysis steered the court safely between
the Scylla of mechanical adherence to the spousal nonprotection
precedent and Charybdis's invitation to revivify the testamentary in-
validity doctrine. Going beyond a mere extension of the "fraudu-
lently illusory" doctrine to revocable trusts, the court took the
opportunity to adopt the modem approach of Newman v. Dore,'
8
that protects a spouse- against inter vivos spousal disinheritance
when the trust settlor has, for all practical purposes, retained the
ownership of the trust property, whether or not the intent is to disin-
herit, and even though the trust would be generally valid for other
purposes. The Godfrey analysis used the same statute that failed to
provide explicit protection as support for the general policy of
spousal protection, and cited the new Probate Code as confirmation
of the court's specific application of that policy.
19
Such development is, of course, guided primarily by sound consid-
erations of policy, designed to keep the law in touch with current
15. Brown v. Crafts, 98 Me. 40, 56 A. 213 (1903); see also Wright v. Holmes, 100
Me. 508, 513, 62 A. 507, 509 (1905) (a mere device or contrivance retaining use and
dominion of property by donor so as to be fraudulent).
16. Mn. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1057 (West 1964) (repealed by P.L 1979, ch.
540, § 24-C, effective Jan. 1, 1981).
17. ME. REv. STAT. ArN. tit. 18-A, § 6-201(a) (West 1981).
18. 9 N.E.2d 966 (N.Y. 1937).
19. "It would be irrational to allow a married person to circumvent the statute by
simply refraining from making a will and, instead, executing trusts which appear to
deplete his estate but which reserve for himself, in effect, the benefits of owning the
trust property." Staples v. King, 433 A.2d at 411 (Me. 1981); see also iL, n.4 and
accompanying text.
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conditions and with the reality of those whom the law is meant to
serve. Yet it can occur only when a court is perceptive enough to
both recognize the opportunity and see the possibilities suggested by
the cases and the statutes that present it.
There are, to varying degrees, other examples of such interstitial
development in the Godfrey property law opinions. Estate of Mc-
Neill,20 written shortly before his leaving the bench in 1983, adopted
the Restatement rules designed to honor the intent of the donor of a
power of appointment, under standards set forth for that purpose.
The court did so by giving effect to an attempt to exercise a testa-
mentary power through a will that did not fully meet the statutory
execution requirements. In Vanasse v. LaBrecque,2'1 involving the
validity of the title of the purchaser of real estate from an executrix
under an allegedly defective license to sell, a Godfrey opinion
steered the court away from an artificial and sterile exercise in juris-
dictional analysis and did so over a strong and extensive dissent by
former Chief Justice Dufresne.
A favorite Godfrey chestnut-estates and future interests-af-
forded an opportunity to adopt a "reasonable time" limitation for
breach of a condition in a defeasible fee simple that had been con-
veyed to a religious society.22 Relying on traditional property law
policies concerning forfeiture and the proper construction of con-
veyances, and looking to the similar approach in other states, the
court concluded that since there was "no precedent to the contrary
in Maine, we deem it correct to apply here the principle of construc-
tion established in other jurisdictions and supported by common
sense."
3
In its law of adverse possession, Maine has long been saddled by ajudicially adopted requirement that, in order to gain title by adverse
possession through the running of the statute of limitations, an ad-
verse possessor, even though honestly but mistakenly believing the
land to be his, must have had an intent to claim the land even if he
had known that it was not his.24 This unique Maine doctrine has
20. 463 A.2d 782 (Me. 1983).
21. 381 A.2d 269 (Me. 1977).
22. Independent Congregational Soc'y v. Davenport, 381 A.2d 1137 (Me. 1978).
The case also includes an enlightened and common sense unitary reading of the
series of deeds conveying the smaller parcels that made up the whole, each deed
containing slightly varying versions of the defeasing conditions.
23. Id. at 1140. The case is also noteworthy for the savory statement that,
although the question of "reasonable time" was normally a question of fact for the
trial court, "[I]n this particular case, however, as a matter of law after a century and
a half, a reasonable time has passed." Id.
24. See, e.g., Preble v. Maine Central R.R. Co., 85 Me. 260, 27 A. 1,19 (1893).
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been roundly criticized on a number of grounds' and has recently
been abolished by statute, at least as to boundary disputes.26
One approach to encouraging reform in this area by a court so
firmly steeped in this anachronistic rule would be to emphasize the
central issue of possession: Was there an adverse possession that
would give the landowner an action and thereby start the running of
the limitations statute?27 Insofar as they go, all three of the Godfrey
opinibns dealing directly with adverse possession do indeed focus
essentially on the issue and nature of possession. The first case,
Clewley v. McTigue Farms, Inc.,' dealt with whether adverse pos-
session had been broken by a period of non-occupancy, thereby
making it not "continuous." The court held that possession had not
been interrupted, notwithstanding the lack of continuous physical
presence on the premises. The second case, McMullen v. Dowley, 9
likewise focused its analysis on the nature of the required possession
in the conventionally accepted way.'
In a suggestion that is not intended to be faint praise, one of the
contributions that also must be attributed to the Godfrey adverse
possession opinions is what they do not do. Consciously or other-
wise, they generally avoid gratuitous elaboration on the various ele-
ments of adverse possession law and of thereby further entrenching
the increasingly mechanical nature of so much of the jurisprudence
in this area.31 The last of his adverse possession trio, in fact, may
25. Those grounds include: ignoring the statutory bar on possession actions; un-
realistically requiring proof of an intent that is unlikely to have existed and hard to
establish reliably;, penalizing the good and honest while rewarding the wicked and
deceitful and even tempting the honest to lie; creating problems of professional eth-
ics; and adding to the basis for a public perception that "the law is a ass." (See
CHARL.S DICKENS, OLIVER T"visT ch. 51: " 'If the law supposes that.' said Mr.
Bumble . . . 'the law is a ass-a idiot.' ").
26. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 810-A (Supp. 1994).
27. See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.3. at 765 (Casner ed. 1952); Brand
v. Prince, 324 N.E.2d 314,316 (N.Y. 1974) ("Reduced to its essentials, [the elements
of adverse possession] mean[ ] nothing more than that there must be possession in
fact of a type that would give the owner a cause of action.., against the occupier
throughout the prescriptive period.").
28. 389 A.2d 849 (Me. 1978).
29. 418 A.2d 1147 (Me. 1980).
30. In order to decide whether the cutting that took place sufficed to consti-
tute "possession" of the northern lot, it is necesssary and sufficient to in-
quire whether the actual use and enjoyment of the lot by Smith and his
successors amounted in kind and degree to the use and enjoyment to be
expected of the average owner of such property.
Id. at 1152 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
31. The same cannot be said for the Godfrey opinion in a case involving the crea-
tion of easements by prescription, Pace v. Carter, 390 A.2d 505 (Me. 1978), where
the court went out of its way to expressly reaffirm prior Maine precedent requiring
"acquiescence" by the servient owner, although that traditional doctrine, based on
the fiction of a "lost grant," has widely been discredited as confusing, misleading,
and counter to the now generally adopted modern analog between adverse posses-
sion and prescriptive easements.
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have the happy distinction of being the only case in all of adverse
possession law to not even routinely recite those elements.3" In this
area at least, a judge can rightly be applauded for simply "doing no
harm."
III. CONCLUSION
Advances made in the law through the opinions of one justice in
one term in one limited area such as the law of property are not
likely, of course, to define an overall architecture of doctrine. The
opinions a justice writes may well not reveal his full influence on the
work of the court. Nor are the influences of the other justices easily
deciphered, if at all, for their effects on the opinions another justice
writes. So it must be in this case.
Yet the opinions do show something of the kind of justice Ed
Godfrey was and its relationship to the person he is. He parsed the
cases, but with a broader vision of why it was to be done, and done
that way, and with the same kind of human awareness and unearned
humility that makes him who he is-which seems to be the thing
that guides him in all of his endeavors and relationships.
Indeed, he had no reason to enjoin upon the 1976 graduates the
irrevocability of having been loved. In Ed Godfrey's case, such ir-
revocability is inherent.
32. Discussing the issue of adverse possession, Godfrey's opinion simply states,
"On the issue of adverse possession, the evidence of record adequately supports the
determination of the trial justice that Castle Hill completely failed to establish its
possession of the disputed land." Richards Realty Co. v. Inhabitants of Town of
Castle Hill, 458 A.2d 753, 754 (Me. 1983).
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